Leibniz on the Principle of Transition by Peña, Lorenzo & Ausín, Txetxu
LEIBNIZ ON THE PRINCIPLE OF TRANSITION
by Lorenzo Peña & Txetxu Ausín
publ. en: Nihil sine ratione: Mensch, Natur und Technik im Wirken von G.W. Leibniz
(Proceedings of the 7th International Leibniz Congress)
Berlin, sept. 2001.
ed. by Hans Poser
pp. 973-981
ISBN 3-9800978-9-7
Arthur Lovejoy’s masterful, highly influential interpretation of Leibniz’s philosophy
has been almost neglected for decades now. This paper tries to rehabilitate Lovejoy’s construal
(with a number of adaptations) by delving into the underlying logical links connecting Leibniz’s
principles of order and gradation (the latter also called ‘law of continuity’, ‘principle of
transition’ or ‘principle of the jumpless change’: natura non facit saltus) with other fundamental
principles of his mature philosophy.
Leibniz’s principle of order, PO, claims that each mapping is such that, whenever the
inputs (the functional arguments) become closer, so do the outputs (the values). (Which, by the
way, does not rule out an inversion of the sense, provided the condition of monotonicity is
respected.) Datis ordinatis, etiam quæsita sunt ordinata. To put it with symbolical notation,
what PO says is that, ∀f∀xyz([z<x<y]→([fz<fx<fy]∨[fy<fx<fz]) .
Leibniz thinks that PO implies the principle of continuity, or PC for short, which
requires that each transition should be made through intermediary steps: to any small difference
of degree as regards the data or the hypotheses, there must correspond a correlativity small
difference of degree as regards the results. In other words, jumps are ruled out.
However we can doubt that such an implication really holds. Suppose that, for x< ,
f(x)=x but that, for x≥ , fx=(x+ ). Such a function, f, is order-preserving and complies with
PO. It is clearly non- ontinuous, though. Thus, besides the fact that PO can be also realized in
a non-dense series of cases (e.g. the function mapping integers into their squares), PO alone
is not proved to imply PC, even for functions whose set or arguments is dense. PC is stronger.
However, most often we seem entitled to take — in a rough or loose way — PO and PC
to express the same idea, or at least closely related ideas. Leibniz never came upon a
sufficiently adequate formulation of PC. His philosophical view of PC seems to have been
some sort of combination of PC and PO.
Of course nowadays mathematicians have introduced a number of meticulous
distinctions and classifications; thus, several concepts Leibniz takes to be equivalent are now
demarcated from one another. Monotonicity, continuity, derivability are now different notions
endowed with clear-cut, crisp definitions, whereas Leibniz frequently runs them together —
which he may be entitled to do under customary assumptions and for a broad range of cases.
However, those mathematical niceties are but of secondary relevance to our purpose in this
paper, which is to inquire into the philosophical significance and defendability of Leibniz’s
views on continuity.
I
Leibniz views both principles as necessarily obtaining not just in the realm of truths
of fact but also in that of verities of reason (even though a number of interpreters have tended
to confine those principles to the former domain), as is evinced by his insistence upon the
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mathematical (esp geometrical) validity of those principles. (See e.g. the Letter «Sun un
principe général», [GP], t. IV, pp. 51ff: ‘[ce principe de l’ordre général] a son origine de
l’infini, il est absolument nécessaire dans la géométrie’; see, too, «Principium quoddam generale
non in mathematicis tantum sed et physicis utile», [GM], t. VI, pp. 129ff: ‘Cum differentia
duorum casuum infra omnem quantitatem datam diminui potest in datis siue positis, necesse est
ut simul diminuatur infra omnem quantitatem in quæsitis siue consequentibus quæ ex positis
resultant’: this is a reasonably clear formulation of PC.)
Even if Leibniz sometimes calls PC ‘an architectonic principle’ (thus in the Tentamen
Anagogicum), he does not confine it to this world or to any particular set of contingent worlds.
Quite the opposite, Leibniz is deeply worried by the existence of apparent counterexamples to
the principle, such as mathematical functions which are discontinuous. Thus, in Opuscules et
fragments inédits, ed. by Couturat, p. 581, Leibniz is concerned over functions wherein
‘Nihilum, Unitas et Infinitum sese consequuntur, nullo interposito’, which would not matter at
all should PC — as several interpreters adduce — be a contingent law ruling over some special
kind of possible worlds only.
That PC is a necessary truth reigning over the whole space of possible words — and
not a contingent law ruling over certain particular possible words such as ours — is clearly
explained by Yvon Belaval (Leibniz critique de Descartes, Paris: Gallimard, 1960, pp. 404-5):
‘Ce principe de l’ordre général est absolument nécessaire, comme en géométrie, car il règne
sur tous les mondes, ensembles de monades compossibles, c’est-à-dire qui s’entr’expriment
intégralement […] mais la manière dont il se réalise en un monde est particulière, contingente
[…]’.
II
Leibniz’s gradualism finds its main realization in PC according to which nature makes
no jumps, i.e. no small increase in the input yields a sudden, abrupt boost in the output. The
short of PC is an idea of proportion or commensurateness to the effect that any similarity or
nearness between two inputs needs to be mirrored by a similarity or nearness between the two
corresponding outputs. This is what ‘Continuity’ is taken to be: the exclusion of jumps.
What (around 1686) led Leibniz to espouse PC was PSR — the principle of sufficient
reason. Leibniz’s (not always explicit) argument can be put as follows. Let us take a function
carrying arguments of a kind X into values of a kind Z, but such that the only feature it takes
into account, as regards members of X, is a certain property P. Now suppose there are two
members of X which, relevantly, differ only in a small degree of P-ness. The corresponding
values, i.e. two members of set Z, must be close to each other as regards the relevant property,
Q, or else the mapping in question is not one taking into account only [degrees of] P-ness.
Thus, PSR entails PC.
A different sort of (often merely implicit) argument adduces that any function in breach
of PC would introduce some arbitrariness or other. If, all of a sudden, a jump occurs at a
certain point, why not before of afterwards? Why exactly that jump instead of a larger or a
smaller one?
The Leibnizian derivation of the rejection of jumps — or interruptions — from PSR is
also sketched out in a number of places. Thus the famous letter to Varignon (1702) clearly
explains the idea: since everything is thoroughly interconnected, no single instance can be
adduced of any property suddenly vanishing or arising without an intermediate transition formed
by a set of inflection-points which render the change explicable.
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III
Leibniz carries his espousal of PC so far that he even commits himself to the view that
all differences are merely variations of degree. A purely qualitative difference would mean a
cleavage, a shift from 0 to 1, or the other way round, without any intermediate steps — hence
a jump, i.e. a mutation which cannot be accounted for in terms of underlying small changes
(such as the flow of time).
Essential differences — which at first sight may seem to be chasms of incommensurable
discrepancy — are, when carefully scrutinized, shown to be only quantitative increases of a
certain underlying property which comes in degrees.
The already mentioned 1702 letter to Varignon contains a quite clear development of
the idea that all kind classifications can be reduced to gradations and thus, in virtue of PC, any
small increase in the series of causes is bound to bring about only a correlatively small increase
in the series of effects. Which would be ruled out by the supposedly purely qualitative character
of the discrepancy between P-ness and non-P-ness.
Thus the chain of entities — along any such path from absence to presence of a certain
property — is such that it is impossible for the senses or the imagination to fix a unique point
where P begins or non-P ends. There is a spread-out border-fringe, a region of inflection or
singularity, inhabited by many kinds partially endowed with mutually contradictory qualities
(P-ness and non-P-ness).
Leibniz claims that the accepted hard and fast lines must be blurred and that the
customary, comfortable sorting rules must be upset and partly subverted by a deeper and more
insightful scanning of the world.
The most startling consequence of PC is the implied claim that all differences are of
degree and not of kind (or, more exactly, that kind differences really amount to nothing but
variations of degree). Leibniz repeatedly comes back to such a conclusion even expressing it
by the joking tittle of ‘principe d’Arlequin’, the view that c’est partout comme ici, to which he
adds: ‘aux différences de degré près’. (Esp. see the NN.EE.) If any two entities whatsoever,
purportedly of different kinds, are just, at most, at the opposite extremes of a chain wherein any
intermediary stretch smoothly blends into its neighbours, then of course all things are alike (but
not exactly alike).
But then, if all differences are variations of degree (an idea whose distant origins go
back at least to Anaxagoras or even Heracleitus), then one could fear that in the end nothing
matters that much. Leibniz is clearly aware of such misgivings; he only cautiously reveals the
whole import of his ideas on the issue. His main — only hinted-at — reply seems to be that
importance (or relevance, or significance) is also a matter of degree. Perhaps nothing matters
to the utmost, but that does not mean that nothing matters at all. Mattering — or carrying weight
— depends on being fraught with ontological and practical consequences. In virtue of PC,
variations of degree in the antecedents are bound to yield only variations of degree in the
consequents; but that does not mean that there is no discrepancy at all.
Leibniz seems to be aware, at least in part, of the serious consequences of his ideas
on the overcoming of the absoluteness of purportedly qualitative boundaries. No strict
separation of different orders of beings can be reconciled with such ideas, and hence easy,
dependable dichotomies must be relativized, fuzzified, by dint of reckoning with entities which
ought to be classified as partly possessing the property under consideration and partly lacking
it.
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Many practical guidelines would be in need of qualification, nuance, flexibilization,
should we espouse PC. Which the early 18th Century was hardly able to envisage (‘this century
[our philosopher says in 1702] is not ripe to receive’ those ideas) and even the 21st Century
is far from being entirely amiable to.
In his letter to Redmond de Monfort (1715) Leibniz draws some conclusions from
those ideas. No leaps can take place in the real world or even in the realm of possible truths.
Any short stretch of apparently abrupt discrepancy is bound to be reduced to underlying gradual
transitions just as the special points on a curve are determinated by its general nature or its
equation.
IV
One of the significant applications of Leibniz’s continuistic or gradualistic metaphysics
is the relation between different species, mainly that between our own human-kind and other
animals. There are bound to be intermediary degrees between men and other animals — and
between animals and plants, between being and non-being.
Leibniz goes considerably beyond his time’s prejudice in denying the then ruling
absolute anthropocentrism. In his Theodicy he expresses his doubts on whether God prefers one
man to the kind of lions (II, §118, Abrégé, II). He develops such views in the NN.EE. and
elsewhere, coming close to evolutionism. However it is also in the NN.EE. that our philosopher
evinces some qualms over the practical consequences of such views.
Suppose that quite similar species live together; what will then be the appropriate
behaviour of members of either to members of the other one? What would be the correct
behaviour of humans towards non-humanus so close to us that the discrepancy would be
exiguous or vanishing?
Thank God — Leibniz replies — such quandaries do not arise. The perfection of the
universe demands an appearance of discontinuity (‘la beauté de la nature, qui veut des
perceptions distinguées, demande des apparences de sauts (NN.EE. IV, ch. 16 §12).
But why does the world’s beauty require that there should appear to be leaps? Is not
continuity more beautiful than interruption according to Leibniz’s lights? Invoking such a need
for apparent discontinuities seems to introduce an ad hoc epicycle in order to reach two goals:
(1) accounting for the fact that our perceptive image of the world seems to leave gaps; (2)
eschew the practical quandaries the side-by-side presence of quite similar kinds of entities (and
in particular animals) would give rise to.
Such hesitations and almost partial retractations show that Leibniz’s gradualism does
not provide a fully satisfactory reply to a number of difficulties. We believe a neoLeibnizian
more tenable gradualism is possible, though. (More on that in our last section, below.)
V
Did Leibniz apply his gradualism to the domain of Law? As far as we have been able
to find out, he did not. When it comes to the realm of law, he seems to be content with the
principle of æqualibus æqualia, or that of treating equal cases alike. But notice that such a
principle does not rule out the existence of legal jumps. If a man snatches £5 and another man
snatches £6, the existing legal system may impose an incomparably harsher penalty to the latter
despite the small difference as regards the hypotheses. Whether such jumps are just or unjust,
they do not transgress the æqualibus æqualia principle.
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Even nowadays it is often claimed that boh justice and juridical certainty demand that
equal cases should be treated alike, but no further demand is posited as regards how to treat
unequal cases.
What seems to be a little odd is for Leibniz to have called his general (physical and
metaphysical) principle of continuity ‘Lex Justitiæ’, and then to refrain from embracing any
such principle precisely with regard to justice as such.
Although, as we noticed above, not all wordings of Leibniz’s PC are logically
equivalent among themselves, suffice it — as regards our current purpose, namely to set forth
corresponding versions of the principle of justice concerning legal matters — to pinpoint the
following possible versions.
Let X, Y, Z be three cases involving the presence of a juridically relevant property,
P, and let A, B, C the juridical consequences of those cases, respectively, involving the presence
of a property Q. Then the Leibnizian lex iustitiæ (applied to juridical matters) can be put in
these different ways:
(1) If the degree to which P is realized in X is smaller than the degree to which it is realized
in Y, then the degree to which Q is realized in A must be smaller than the degree to
which Q is realized in B.
(2) If the discrepancy between the degree of P in X and the degree of P in Y is smaller than
the discrepancy between the degree of P in Y and in Z, then as much happens as
regards the discrepancy between the degrees of Q in A, B, C.
(3) If there is at least as high a presence of P in Y as there is in X, then there is at least as
high a presence of Q in B as there is in A.
(4) If the degree of P in Y is intermediary between the degrees of P in X and in Z, then the
degree of Q in B also lies in between the degrees of Q in A and in C. (Notice though,
that — in a stretched sense if you want — any quantity lies between itself and itself, i.e.
X lies between X and X.)
(1) is the rule making it mandatory to treat unequal cases unequally. Leibniz apparently
espoused the metaphysical counterpart of (1) but we have found no evidence that he embraced
(1) itself when discussing juridical matters. Notice that there were occasional moments in the
juridical tradition when (1) seemed to be tempting legislators but, as a whole, traditional law
was deeply inimical to (1) and even our modern, more humane and less draconian codes are
far from accepting it. (1) rules out not only legal leaps but also unsensitiveness to the degree
of presence of the relevant property in the hypothesis. An extreme case would be one wherein
every difference of degree of P would leave the degree of Q unaffected. Then of course we
would not be entitled to say that P was a juridically relevant property at all (at least not for
juridical consequences involving Q). We sometimes find it distressing that two cases involving
quite discrepant degrees of P should be legally treated in the same way; that is why (1) has
some claim on us as a desideratum of fairness. However, all in all (1) seems to impose an
excessive constraint, and we had better avoid committing ourselves to anything that strong.
As for (2), it would entail that, if empowering oneself of £3 entails a penalty of one
month emprisonment and empowering oneself of £4 entails an year emprisonment, then
empowering oneself of £7 must entail at least an emprisonment of 33 months. However (2)
does not imply (1) — appearances to the contrary notwithstanding. If whosoever unlawfully
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empowers himself of any amount of money must serve 1 year emprisonment, regardless of the
concrete amount of money, then (2) — but not (1) — is complied with.
Leibniz sometimes seems to be countenancing the metaphysical counterpart of (2). As
a juridical constraint (2) would be hard to be really considered, albeit a lingering impression
(or «intuition» if you like) tells us that (2) is also a vague desideratum.
(3) is a principle of legal monotonicity. It implies that empowering oneself of £4 must
be legally dealt with in at least as severe a manner as empowering oneself of £3. Probably all
legal systems have complied with (3), since — as far as we know — no legal system has ever
increased the severity up to a certain point and then decreased it (or anything like that). (3) does
not rule out the existence of leaps, but forbids the existence of successive leaps in opposite
directions. Notice that (3) also rules out a continuous, gradual mapping with sinuosities, which
sometimes goes upwards and sometimes downwards. (People are fond of saying that in practice
[though, of course, not in theory, and theory alone is of any concern to us here] legal treatment
of unlawful acts breaches (3) and that empowering oneself of £1,000 entails a more severe
punishment than empowering oneself of £100, but that empowering oneself of £1,000,000 in
practice entails no punishment.)
(4) is the juridical counterpart of PO. (4) means that in-betweennes as regards the
hypotheses is bound to entail in-betweenness as regards the juridical results. But, oddly enough,
(4) does not really prevent the existence of leaps. Suppose that empowering oneself of less than
£5 entails at most one month emprisonment whereas empowering oneself of £5 or more entails
a term of 10 years emprisonment, with an additional aggravation of one day for any cent above
the £5 limit. Then, oddly enough, (4) is not broken. But surely the pre-theoretical idea of a
continuity of legal treatment would fall afoul of such a situation, which clearly involves the
existence of a tremendous leap.
All that shows that finding out a clear formulation of the exclusion of leaps is no easy
matter, either as regards juridical issues or as concerns metaphysics of philosophy of nature.
We are afraid that the exclusion of leaps cannot be adequately worded with the crisp
terms of ‘equal’, ‘unequal’, ‘more’, or ‘less’ alone, but needs the introduction of a fuzzy term,
‘similar’. Then the legal principle of continuity would mean:
(5) Whenever the degrees to which the juridically relevant property P is realized in two cases,
X and Z, are similar, then so are the degrees to which the juridically relevant ensuing
property, Q, is realized in the respective juridical consequences, A and B.
In other words, you are forbidden from dealing with similar cases in quite discrepant
ways.
Admittedly (5) lacks the clearcut precision of (1) through (4) but it seems to be what
we mean when we spurn juridical leaps. And (5)’s metaphysical counterpart would be probably
more defensible than those of the other candidates we have pondered.
(5) rules out leaps, for it implies that no small increase in the degree to which the
juridically relevant property is realized may entail a huge increase in the degree of realization
of the juridical consequence. Thus inflicting at most a 3-month emprisonment on culprits having
taken at most £5 and 2 years on those having taken £5.01 clearly runs afoul of (5).
(5) is not an entirely perfect principle of fairness, though, since small sinuosities would
be compatible with it. Thus perhaps what really we want is a combination of (5) and
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monotonicity (i.e. (3)). However such small sinuosities don’t seem to be a real problem in legal
practice, since — as far as we know — they neither exist nor have ever existed.
Although (5) — or its metaphysical counterpart — seems to us to be quite congenial to
Leibniz’s whole project — and probably a better way of casting the idea our philosopher
endeavours to take hold of and set forth in a convincing, reasonable way — we have failed to
find our own formulation, (5), in any of Leibniz’s texts, even if quite often it seems to us that
the Master is hanging around something vaguely resembling (5) — or rather its metaphysical
counterpart — but failed to express it in so many words.
As already noticed above, the main difference between formulation (5), on the one
hand, and (1) through (4), on the other, is that all terms occurring in (1)-(4) are all-or-nothing
notions. (Thus, to be more-so-and-so than another thing is not a matter of degree. If John is
wealthier than Robert and so is Jack, it cannot be the case that John is more wealthier-than-
Robert than Jack.)
On the contrary, similarity comes in degrees. Thus our most satisfactory candidate to
the title of adequate formulation of the lex iustitiæ, or principle of juridical continuity, is a
sentence involving a fuzzy term, ‘similar’; without resorting to fuzzy terms convenient
formulations of the principle ruling out jumps may, after all, be found, but we haven’t happened
to hit on any such formulation. Thus we surmise that a good enough formulation of the
principle requires using fuzzy terms.
Anyway there are several difficulties surrounding the principle, whether under our own
formulation or under any alternative one forbidding the existence of juridical leaps. The most
usual objection is that some line or other ought to be drawn on pain of giving rise to quandaries
or perplexities.
The objection can be sketched out by pointing out that legal norms — or norms of any
kind whatsoever — are rules of conduct which must establish guidelines for human behaviour;
but, allegedly, no such guideline would be possible unless it drew a line between what is
mandatory and what is not — or between what is permissible and what is not — so as to direct
people’s behaviour in the sense of refraining from forbidden actions. Consequently, hard and
fast lines are needed, and so leaps are unavoidable, since whatever lies on the wrong side of
the line has to be out-and-out rejected whereas what lies beneath the line is admissible
behaviour.
If the objection is particularly addressed to Leibniz (assuming Leibniz should uphold
the juridical lex iustitiæ under our proposed (5) formulation), it would have a point, since
Leibniz himself always embraced classical, two-valued, Aristotelian logic, with its two polarly
opposed values of pure, and complete, truth and pure, and utter, falsity. Accordingly either an
action is entirely licit or else it is altogether illicit. Furthermore, either an action can be
altogether characterized as being so-and-so or else it cannot at all be so characterized. Likewise,
either an action is entirely performed or else it is nor performed at all (i.e. it remains a purely
possible completely unrealized action).
Thus espousing the jumplessness principle — be it for the juridical domain or in any
other field — is incompatible with maintaining Aristotelian, two-valued logic.
But from the standpoint of a nonAristotelian infinite-valued logic things are not so. We
needn’t waive the principle of excluded middle — to the effect that either an entity is so-and-so
or else it isn’t. What we need is to jettison the result of prefixing to the principle of excluded
middle the particle ‘completely’. Since the operator ‘completely’ (or ‘wholly’ etc) distributes
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over disjunction («Entirely (p-or-q)» is equivalent to «Entirely p or entirely q»), what we are
in effect rejecting is the alternative between a certain fact existing altogether and its complete
failure to exist.
If there are degrees (degrees of legality or licitness, degrees of being-so-and-so, degrees
of realization of an action), then no line has to be drawn. It is not the case that whatever lies
beyond the (supposed) line is out-and-out rejectable or blameworthy, whereas whatever remains
this side is entirely all right. What there exists is a porous, diffuse, stretch or fringe, wherein
the farther from the good extreme an action lies, the more blame-worthy it is.
How can such a neo-Leibnizian approach be reconciled with our need for practical
guidelines or rules of conduct instructing us as to what is to be done and what is not? The
answer is again that it is not a matter of either entirely avoiding a certain action or else
completely-taking it as something which we can envisage doing. There are degrees. Degrees
of prevention, degrees of acceptance. Thus we can contemplate a certain behaviour with some
degree of apprehension, but less so than another course of action which we we absolutely rule
out.
Equally, once an action has been realized, there are sundry degrees to which it can be
classified as being of such and such a kind. Thus, even if any behaviour of the kind is illicit,
since the action under consideration can be more, or less, included into that kind, its licitness,
or illicitness, can vary. Finally, even when two actions are equally (to the same degree)
characterizable as being so-and-so, their respective degrees of reality can be different. The one
can be more thoroughly realized than the other.
Most of all, to forbid a certain behaviour must entail to sanction it somehow or other
(at the very least with some sort of legal upbraiding: whatever is banned is such that, at the
very least, those who commit such a behaviour are to be regarded as transgressors). But
sanctions can be harsher or less harsh. The more severe the penalty, the more forbidden the thus
punished action.
A partly different sort of objection against our neoLeibnizian approach would be that
it runs afoul of the need for juridical certainty or security. Supposed that, instead of drawing
a clear-cut line, you simply claim that, the more a behaviour exemplifies a certain property, the
less licit it is. Then — the objector goes on to say — there is bound to arise a feeling of quandary
or uncertainty. Surely no writen legal norm can settle as many different punishments as there
are different actions inflicting to someone a certain degree of pain. Thus the only practical way
of abiding by the requirements of the leaplessness principle is to leave concrete adjudications
of guilt and punishment to judges, i.e. to set forth legal norms with fuzzy terms, leaving it to
the judicial power to establish the adequate legal treatment in each case.
We reply that such a result is correct but needn’t entail the apprehended uncertainty
or insecurity, provided the legal system as a whole provides a mechanism in order to introduce
uniformity or consistency. The mechanism exists in all legal systems endowed with procedures
of appeal and revision.
Thus we reach the conclusion that our neoLeibnizian approach to juridical issues can
be successfully implemented and would offer a more humane, more just, more flexible
framework than those recommended by adherents of hard and fast lines, i.e. of such people as
believe that leaps are necessary and therefore acceptable.
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VI
One source of disquiet remains, though: why did Leibniz never apply PC to legal
matters, even if he called the principle itself ‘lex iustitiæ’. The most probable answer which
occurs to us is that there are plausible biographical reasons for that, but also logical grounds.
As we have said above, consistently espousing the rejection of leaps calls for a gradualistic
nonAristotelian logic, a logic of degrees of truth or existence. Now the only reference we have
found in the Leibnizian corpus to the implementation of a logic of degrees is NN.EE. I IV, c.
16 (and of course similar passages elsewhere) to the effect that ‘il faudrait une nouvelle espèce
de logique qui traiterait des degrés de probabilité […]’. (On the need for a logic implementing
degrees of verisimilitude also see a letter to D. Elerum, 10 May 1716, ap. Couturat, La Logique
de Leibniz, p. 583.)
As we see, Leibniz is envisaging a new gradualistic logic, but a logic of degrees of
probability, not of truth. When it comes to truth, he hangs on to the hard and old dichotomy
of 1/0. Perhaps he lacked the conceptual tools needed for a fuzzy logic of degrees of truth. On
perhaps he possessed such tools but he lacked the time needed for such a colossal enterprise.
Or perhaps he cringed from such a prospect owing to his (by and large) quite reasonable maxim
of going by the received, entrenched, established and inherited opinions as far as possible.
Most of all we believe the right answer to such a question is that, Leibniz-ways, the
cognitive enterprise is a collective, continuous, cooperative and trans-generational task. Leibniz
anticipated many contemporary thoughts and research-lines — including some philosophical
motivations for fuzzy logic — but he couldn’t jump over the boundaries of his life-time.
Our second reply — which especially applies to his failure to consider PC as a rule for
legal matters — attends to the fact that most Leibnizian writings on juridical issues were written
in his youth, whereas PC tends to be a view characterizing his later life and thought (from
1686-87 on). Admittedly things are not that clear-cut. There are several important juridical
papers written in 1693 and later. (Thus the Corpus iuris gentium diplomaticus was written in
1693 and 1700. In 1696 (see [GM] III pp. 347ff, letter to Jean Bernouilli) he was considering
a projected Elementa perpetui iuris; a few months before his death, on July 1st, 1716 (see
Couturat, p. 584) he was still caressing the idea of rationally recasted civil code.) And we
occasionally find early pronouncements hinting at something like PC. All in all, though, the
discrepancy exists as regards the shifting of his main interests and orientation. Had he come
back to a full-time juridical vocation, then perhaps he would have followed the path blazed by
his continuistic principle.
VII
Although, as the reader has gathered, we deeply sympathize with Leibniz’scontinuism,
we admit that Leibniz’s own formulations go too far and that a more tenable principle of
continuity is not easy to find.
PC rules out jumps whereas the existence of only one possible world, out of the
infinite series of closely pair-wise closely resembling worlds, is a glaring case of a huge,
tremendous, abyssal chasm. The principle would demand that whenever two given cases (i.e.
two possible-worlds as ideally placed along a line of increasing perfection or metaphysical
goodness) s’approchent continuellement et se perdent enfin l’un dans l’autre, so do the results
(‘les suites ou événements ou ce qui est demandé’, [GP] III p. 52). Yet all worlds infinitely
close to ours in their degree of perfection, even when the discrepancy s’évanouit, for ever
remain entirely unrealized, whereas ours alone is blessed with real existence.
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Leibniz could face such a difficulty by developing a nonAristotelian logic allowing for
degrees of existence so as to have God choose each possible world to a certain extent, giving
more reality to those worlds which, by their essential nature, deserve it more. The outcome
would be a many-worlds universe, with different degrees of reality belonging to diversely
perfect worlds. Admittedly such a universe would include, as real entities, all possible
individual and facts — which doubtless is a quasi-Spinozistic result Leibniz would be eager to
avoid.
Thus there are forceful reasons for Leibniz to refrain from applying PC to the function
mapping the essential quantity of worlds into existence or inexistence. The mapping is
discontinuous and jumpy. Leibniz could make it continuous only by coming quite close to
Spinozistic metaphysics (at least as regards the claim that all possible are — at least to some
extent — real) and by embracing a non two-valued logic and hence by proposing an alternative
framework to classical sentential calculus.
[One of the two authors of this paper has already shown in «Le choix de Dieu et le
principe du meilleur» (Dialectica vol. 47, Fasc. 2-3 (1993), pp. 217-54) how a neoLeibnizian
possible-worlds Lewis-like realistic metaphysics can be reconciled with a nuanced version of
Leibniz’s theodicy.]
As already mentioned above, there is another strong objection against both PO and PC,
one which did not escape Leibniz’s attention altogether: there are both in mathematics and in
real life mappings which do not abide by such principles.
Thus Leibniz would be compelled to fall back on some weaker position. There are a
number of alternatives. One is simply that many — perhaps most — transitions comply with PO
(and indeed PC). Another one is that, in some sense to be elucidated, each transition in breach
of PC supervenes on an orderly transition (one complying with PC). A third alternative would
be that nature tends to prefer orderly and smooth transitions and those transitions alone are
unorderly or abrupt which are bound to be so owing to a more powerful reason.
He hope that, one way or the other, a commonsensical implementation of Leibniz’s
gradualism can be logistically structured through a many-valued nonAristotelian calculus (a
fuzzy system). Such a watered-down Leibnizian gradualism would retain many inferential links
with the board of basic logico-metaphysical principles reigning over Leibniz’s whole
philosophical enterprise.
